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Abstract (UK) 
Shortly before the national elections in the Netherlands, the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) evaluates the economic effects of the policy proposals in 
election programs. This paper investigates the sensitivity of this analysis to the uncertainty 
of parameter estimates in the economic models that are used. For this purpose, a Monte 
Carlo analysis of five election programs is performed, using a core version of one of the 
CPB models. We find that the range of projected outcomes is surprisingly small. 
Nonetheless, caution remains needed, especially when the estimated effects of different 
parties are roughly similar.  
 
Abstract (NL) 
Kort voor de landelijke verkiezingen in Nederland rekent het Centraal Plan Bureau (CPB) 
de verkiezingsprogramma’s van de verschillende politieke partijen door. Bij deze 
doorrekening worden de economische effecten van de verschillende programma’s geschat. 
Dit paper onderzoekt de gevoeligheid van deze schattingen voor onzekerheid in de 
parameters die gebruikt worden in de economische modellen. Hiertoe wordt een Monte 
Carlo analyse uitgevoerd van vijf verkiezingsprogramma’s met behulp van een kleine versie 
van één van de CPB-modellen. De gevonden onzekerheid in de uitkomsten van het model is 
verrassend klein. Desalniettemin is voorzichtigheid bij het gebruiken van de resultaten op 
zijn plaats, zeker wanneer de uitkosten van verschillende politieke partijen dicht bij elkaar 
liggen.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Prior to national elections in the Netherlands, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (CPB) evaluates the economic effects of the policy proposals in election programs. 
This standing practice was the subject of a conference in April 2002 (Graafland and Ros, 
2003). At this conference some participants expressed their concern about the fact that the 
uncertainty of the predictions is unknown and that model assumptions underlying the 
analysis cannot be tested. Despite this scholarly criticism, the analysis of election programs 
plays an important role in the political debate during the pre-election period. The strong 
influence of the CPB analysis is underlined in the following quotation: 
 
“Since 1986 the larger Dutch political parties seek the CPB’s seal of approval 
for their electoral programs. It is a unique phenomenon indeed that CPB 
prognoses for employment, income (and its distribution) and the budget deficit 
play an important role in the election campaigns. Astonishing as this may 
seem to anyone who has ever built or used economic models, popular trust in 
the CPB’s numerical precision is so great that a predicted difference of a few 
thousand jobs can become the selling point of an election platform.” (Haffner 
and Van Bergeijk, 1994) 
 
The program evaluations published by the CPB are often used by politicians and the media 
as if they are completely certain and accurate, whereas they are in fact likely to be subject to 
a considerable degree of uncertainty and the predictions may be sensitive to some of the 
assumptions implicit in the models that are used. Recently some Belgian politicians have 
expressed their interest in this system and are considering implementing a similar system in 
Belgium (de Crem 2003). In this perspective this paper tries to evaluate the Dutch system by 
trying to gain insight into the effect of uncertainty on the CPB analysis of election programs.  
This paper investigates parameter uncertainty as one source of uncertainty in the 
CPB analysis.1 The models usually contain parameters that are estimated in separate 
econometric analyses. Parameter uncertainty means that the estimated parameter values are 
surrounded by a confidence interval as expressed by their standard errors. As the predicted 
effects of economic policies depend on the quantitative values of these model parameters, 
                                                     
1
 Other sources of uncertainty are, among others, the choice of the relevant economic theory, the specifications 
of the model and uncertainty about the preliminary data and of non-policy exogenous variables that are used to 
calibrate the models (see Graafland (2003)). 
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parameter uncertainty generates uncertainty in the policy effect simulated by the model. For 
example, the certainty that a tax reduction targeted at low skilled labour reduces low skilled 
unemployment depends largely on the robustness of the estimated value of the elasticity of 
substitution between high en low skilled labour. This means that the certainty that the 
programs of political parties that propose this kind of specific tax reductions is more 
effective in reducing low skilled unemployment than the programs of parties that propose 
more general tax reductions to fight unemployment depends on the confidence interval of 
this parameter.   
  Until now, the effects of this uncertainty has only been analysed for one parameter 
at a time and only for some of the possible values of this parameter (Graafland 2001). In this 
analysis, the effects of implementing the complete range of uncertainty for all parameters 
simultaneously will be studied. For this purpose, a Monte Carlo analysis is performed on the 
parameter set of the Mini-MIMIC model. This model is a small version of the MIMIC 
model, which focuses on long-term labour market effects of the political programs 
(Bovenberg et al., 2000). The Monte Carlo analysis is a method that calculates all possible 
‘what-if’ scenarios by generating random values for uncertain variables (i.e. the model 
parameters of Mini-MIMIC) by using information of the probability distribution of these 
variables. Using standard errors (and correlations) of the parameter estimates, we analyze 
the robustness of the outcomes of the programs of political parties for key policy variables 
such as unemployment and employment. 
The content of the paper is as follows. First, we briefly review the analysis of the 
CPB and the uncertainty in the outcomes (section 2). Next, we describe the Mini-MIMIC 
model and apply this model to the election programs of five political parties from the 
national elections in 1998 (section 3). In section 4, a Monte Carlo analysis will be 
performed on the election programs. The effect of parameter uncertainty on the model 
predictions for each political party will be studied. Specifically, we will study the 
probability distributions characterizing the uncertainty of the outcomes of the election 
programs, the differences and possible overlaps between these distributions and the 
robustness of the rankings of the five election programs with respect to several policy 
variables. Section 5 summarizes the main findings. 
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2 The CPB analysis of the Dutch election programs and sources of uncertainty 
 
A main task of CPB is to analyse the economic consequences of policy proposals (Donders 
and Graafland, 1988). The analysis of election programs by the CPB began in 1986. In that 
year the three largest political parties (CDA, PvdA and VVD)2, asked the CPB to analyse 
their election programs. Since then, five more parties have followed this initiative (CPB, 
2002). The scope of the analysis has gradually widened over the years. In 1986 only the 
budgetary effects and the economic consistency of the proposed policies were evaluated. 
Nowadays the contents of the CPB analysis cover four areas:3 
- effects on the public budget, 
- estimated macroeconomic effects (for example, estimated (un)employment effects), 
- effects on the income distribution of different types of households, 
- in-depth research of a specific topic (such as the reforms of the health care sector). 
The analysis is based on multiple methods, ranging from simple spreadsheet programs to 
large macroeconomic models. In this paper, we focus on the second part: the prediction of 
macroeconomic effects using large-scale economic models. JADE is the most important 
model that is used for this purpose.4 In order to take account of the effects of specific 
policies, the outcomes of JADE are adjusted and disaggregated on the basis of simulation 
outcomes of other large models. For this purpose, the CPB uses MIMIC to analyze the 
labour market effects of changes in the tax- and social security system (Graafland et al., 
2001) and ATHENA to analyze policy that targets individual sectors.  
 
2.1 Sources of uncertainty 
 
The CPB analysis has several merits and limitations.5 One such limitation is that the 
analysis provides no insight in the robustness of the outcomes. We therefore do not know 
how conclusive the predictions of the relative performance of the political programs really 
are. The CPB itself emphasizes that the predictions are uncertain and warns not to focus on 
the exact outcomes of the analysis but rather on the relative positions of the political parties. 
However, one look in the Dutch newspapers during election time shows that this 
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 See table 1 in section 3 for a brief description of  the political parties considered. 
3
 For a description of the CPB analysis and the procedures followed, see Don (2003). 
4
 For an elaborate discussion of the different models used by the CPB see Graafland and Ros (2003, p50). 
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recommendation is widely ignored. Moreover, the impact of uncertainty may not only be 
restricted to the absolute size of policy effects, but may also affect conclusions about the 
relative performance of the election programs. Performing an ex-ante uncertainty analysis 
could provide insight into the uncertainty of the predicted effects.  
Uncertainty about the macroeconomic effects predicted by large models has several 
sources. Graafland (2003) distinguishes five sources: the selection of economic mechanisms 
in the models, the specification of the economic theories that describe these mechanisms, 
the empirical specification of the models, the integration of the results of different models, 
and the uncertainty following from the fact that not all of the proposals and all of the effects 
can be analysed quantitatively by the CPB. With respect to the latter point, Bomhoff has 
criticized the CPB for not taking the economic effects of less crime or a better infrastructure 
into account (see Bomhoff (1994) and Bomhoff and Van der Geest (2003)). The effect of 
model selection can easily be seen by comparing the predictions from different models. The 
differences are often substantial (Graafland, 2003). The impact of economic theory can be 
seen from the evolution of economic models after the new-classical uprising against the 
dominant Keynesian paradigm in the 1970’s (e.g.: Diebold (1998), pp 175-192). The latter 
example also shows that a paradigm shift does not necessarily lead to more accurate 
predictions. Don (2001) further specifies the effect of model specification on forecast 
accuracy and distinguishes four elements: preliminary data, prediction of non-policy 
exogenous variables, model parameters and the model residuals. Don finds that the 
uncertainty in the predictions is rather large. The average forecast error in annual growth 
rates (four year ahead) is 1.7% for consumption and 1.1% for production enterprises. This 
uncertainty is predominantly caused by uncertainty about the values of non-policy 
exogenous variables and the model residuals in the model equations. 
The CPB has regularly studied the (ex-post) forecast accuracy of their models. These 
studies do not indicate a decrease in the uncertainty of the predictions over the last decade 
(Donders and Kranendonk, 1999). Considerable progress has been made as compared to the 
first pioneering econometric models, but recent years show no further reduction of the 
forecast uncertainty. In fact, it will take a lot of effort to keep the error margins at its current 
level. Many economists have argued that we will not be able to reach a higher level of 
accuracy in the future (Klein, 1981). Since total model uncertainty is not very likely to 
decrease much further over time, it is essential to study the potential of an ex-ante 
uncertainty analysis.  
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 For an extensive analysis of the pros and cons of the analysis, see Graafland and Ros (2003). 
 5
In this paper we focus on the impact of parameter uncertainty and disregard the 
influence from other sources. This means that we abstract from the fundamental sources of 
model miss-specification mentioned by Graafland (2003). We only investigate the impact of 
parameter uncertainty on the economic outcomes of a given economic model. The standard 
errors and the correlation matrix of the estimates provide a quantitative assessment of the 
size of this uncertainty. The other sources of uncertainty with respect to forecast accuracy 
specified by Don (2001) - uncertainty in preliminary data, prediction of non-policy 
exogenous variables and the unobserved variation that constitutes the error terms - impact 
the base line prediction in a similar fashion as the policy scenarios. In linear models the 
uncertainty from these sources is irrelevant, because the change in the simulation path will 
be equal to the change in the baseline prediction, rendering no effect on policy simulation. 
In non-linear models there is some impact. However, it is usually of secondary importance. 
On the other hand, changing the parameters associated with the policy variables and the 
variables that are endogenous to the model will even in a linear model change the outcome 
of the policy scenario not in the same way as the baseline scenario, thus changing the 
predicted policy effect.6 
 
2.2 Monte Carlo analysis 
 
Focusing only on parameter uncertainty allows a very systematic analysis. For this purpose, 
we apply the so-called Monte Carlo method. A Monte Carlo analysis basically calculates all 
possible “what-if” scenarios, assuming that uncertainty can be characterized by a known 
probability distribution. The outcome of every scenario is weighed by the probability it 
occurs. To apply this to the case of parameter uncertainty, a joint probability distribution of 
all uncertain parameters is constructed. For every scenario a random draw is taken from this 
distribution and the model is solved using these parameter values. This process is repeated 
as many times as necessary. The result is a distribution of outcomes, in which the 
probability with which a certain outcome may occur is instantly clear. This is an important 
advantage over the “what-if” method of sensitivity analysis that tests the robustness of the 
outcomes for a limited set of alternative parameter values of which the probability is 
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 To illustrate, suppose that the baseline prediction is: yb = a1 x + a2 zb  + r (where a1 and a2 denote model 
parameters, x a non-policy exogenous variable, z the policy variable and r the model residual) and that the 
policy prediction equals: yp = a1 x + a2 zp + r. The effectiveness of the policy measure thus equals: (yp – yb) / 
(zp – zb) = a2. Clearly, changing x or r does not affect the effect of the policy change, but a2 does. 
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unknown (Vose, 1996).7 For an application of this type of sensitivity analysis to the MIMIC 
model, see Graafland et al. (2001). 
A disadvantage of the Monte Carlo method is that it may be time consuming and 
complicated for large economic models used by the CPB. Even though modern computers 
are capable of these computations, many practical and theoretical problems can arise. This 
might explain why CPB has never performed Monte Carlo analyses with large economic 
models such as JADE, MIMIC and Athena. For researchers from outside the CPB who do 
not have access to these models it is impossible to do so. For this reason, we use a smaller 
version model of one of the large CPB models. As the CPB has not developed a small 
version of JADE, we use a core version of MIMIC: the Mini-MIMIC model. The main 
building blocks are very similar to those in MIMIC and JADE and partly based on empirical 
research that was used for both models. The most important equation – the wage equation – 
is even exactly identical to the wage equation in MIMIC. As shown by a sensitivity analysis 
in Graafland et al. (2001), the wage equation produces most of the variation in outcomes. 
The Monte Carlo analysis of simulation results of Mini-MIMIC will therefore provide a 
good indication of the uncertainty of the analysis with large-scale CPB models. 
 
3 Election programs in Mini-MIMIC 
 
The Mini-MIMIC model is a small-scale applied general equilibrium model, and was 
developed by the CPB to make the structure of the full MIMIC model more transparent.8 
Essentially, Mini-MIMIC describes the main relationships in the MIMIC model in a 
nutshell. In this section, we analyze whether Mini-MIMIC is also capable to reproduce the 
main results of the MIMIC analysis of election programs. 
 
3.1 Main features of Mini-MIMIC 
 
Mini-MIMIC distinguishes between various types of labour (skilled and unskilled labour). 
Figure 1 reviews the most important relations between institutions and the labour market in 
Mini-MIMIC that hold for both types of labour. An increase in the VAT rate raises the 
(consumer) price leading to higher wage claims in order to compensate for the loss in 
                                                     
7
 For a discussion of other advantages of the Monte Carlo method, see Vose (1996). 
8
 MIMIC is an acronym for Micro Macro model to  analyze the Institutional Context. For an application of 
MIMIC, see Graafland (2000). For a description of Mini-MIMIC, see the Appendix. For a more elaborate 
description of Mini-MIMIC and MIMIC, see Bovenberg et al. (2000) and Graafland et al. (2001), chapter 2, 3 
and 15.2. 
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purchasing power (so-called wage resistance). A similar wage effect results from a rise in 
the direct tax rate (defined as the sum of income tax and social premiums). On top of this, an 
increase in the marginal tax rate has a negative impact on labour supply because of the 
substitution effect, whereas an increase in the average tax rate has a positive impact because 
of the income effect. Furthermore, the replacement rate (defined as the ratio between net 
unemployment benefit and net wage) has a positive impact on wages by enforcing the threat 
point of employees in the wage bargaining process. 
 
Figure 1: Main links in the Mini-MIMIC model 
Replacement rates
Model of the firm Household model
VAT-rate Income tax and social 
premium rate
Prices
Wage bargaining model
Employment Labour supply
Unemployment
 
The rise in gross wages deteriorates the competitiveness of Dutch companies and lowers 
employment. The confrontation of employment and labour supply yields the unemployment, 
which has a negative impact on wages because unemployment weakens the bargaining 
power of workers. The model implies that the equilibrium level of unemployment depends 
positively on the VAT rate, the direct tax rate and the replacement rate.  
 
3.2 Applying Mini-MIMIC to election programs 
 
Table 1 describes the central characteristics of the political parties and their election 
programs. In order to simulate the effects of the policy proposals in the election programs, 
these proposals first have to be phrased in terms of model inputs. Until 1998 the CPB 
published some specifics about the way in which the MIMIC model was used to evaluate 
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the election programs. Since then, the CPB has not published the MIMIC results separately, 
nor the assumptions made about the policy proposals in the MIMIC-analysis. We will 
therefore use the 1998 evaluation of election programs for our analysis of parameter 
uncertainty. 
 
Table 1: Main points of the electoral programs in 1998 
Acronym 
Name in 
English Profile Main points of the election program 
PvdA Labour party Social 
democratic 
Decrease the marginal tax rate in the first tax bracket 
Increase the high VAT rate 
Replace basic allowance by labour based tax credit 
Core: Tax reduction for lower incomes, stimulate labour 
supply of women  
VVD People’s party 
for freedom and 
democracy 
Conservative 
liberal 
Lower all marginal tax rates 
Increase the high VAT rate 
Introduction of a tax credit for workers 
Abolish specific payroll tax cuts for unskilled wages 
Core: lower tax burden for all workers, more incentives to 
accept work  
CDA Christian 
Democratic 
Appeal 
Christian 
democratic 
Lengthen the first tax bracket 
Increase the low and high VAT rate 
Decrease all marginal tax rates slightly 
Core: a slightly lower tax burden for workers 
D66 Democrats 66 Social liberal Lower all marginal tax rates 
Increase the high VAT rate 
Introduction of an EITC 
Core: a lower tax burden for all workers, more incentives 
for unskilled labour supply by EITC  
GroenLinks Green Left Progressive 
environmentalist 
Decrease the marginal tax rate in the first tax bracket 
Decrease the length of the second and third tax bracket 
Increase the high VAT rate 
Introduce an EITC 
Core: a far more progressive tax system, incentive for 
unskilled labour supply by EITC 
 
 
Table 2 presents the MIMIC predictions for the different political parties as well as the 
Mini-MIMIC results for those parties. For the PvdA, all values show the same trends as 
predicted by the MIMIC model, except for labour supply. The reason for this difference is 
that the PvdA particularly aims at stimulating labour supply of the partners of the main 
breadwinners, who have a relatively high wage elasticity. This group does not exist 
separately in Mini-MIMIC. As a result, Mini-MIMIC is unsuitable for predicting the effect 
of this element of the PvdA election program. For the remainder, Mini-MIMIC mimics 
MIMIC rather well. The fall in the replacement rate for unskilled labour (-2,0 %-points) and 
the lower average tax rate  (-3,1 %-points) puts downward pressure on the wages of 
unskilled workers (-2,4 %). As a result, unemployment declines (-1,5 %-points), especially 
for the unskilled (-3,4 %-points). Although the VAT-tariff increases (1,3 %-points), net 
wages go up, due to the large decrease in the average tax rates. Labour supply decreases (-
0,5 %) due to the fact that the income effect dominates the substitution effect in Mini-
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MIMIC. The long-term costs of the PvdA proposals for the government amount to 1% of 
GDP. The main explanation for the difference in the long-term costs between the two 
models lies in the difference in the tax revenues due to differences in labour supply. 
The effects of the policy proposals of the CDA are relatively small. In fact these 
“disappointing” results of the CDA policy proposals were used against them in the election 
campaign of 1998. The drop in the replacement rates (-0,5 %-points, which is quite small) 
results in a small decline in the wages (-0,9 %) and unemployment (-0,5 %-points). Net 
wages increase, due to the reduction of the average tax rate (-1,8 %-points), and private 
consumption grows (2,2 %). As a result of the decrease in the marginal tax rate, labour 
supply increases (0,8 %). The effect on government consumption is larger than that 
predicted by MIMIC since both the increase in labour supply and the decrease in 
unemployment generate higher tax revenues in Mini-MIMIC. 
 
Table 2: MIMIC and Mini-MIMIC simulation results9 
  PvdA CDA VVD D66 GroenLinks 
Input  
 
Absolute changes (in percentage points) 
Replacement Rate -0.8 -0.5 -1.4 -1.1 -3.7 
- of which unskilled* -2.0 -0.5 -2.2 -2.9 -6.7 
VAT-Rate 1.3 2.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Average Direct Tax Rate -3.1 -1.8 -2.7 -2.8 -4.6 
- of which unskilled -6.2 -1.5 0.2 -3.7 -6.8 
Marginal Direct Tax Rate -0.5 -2.6 -3.6 -1.6 -3.9 
- of which unskilled -2.5 -2.6 -1.0 -1.6 -4.5 
      
Output Mimic Mini-
mimic Mimic 
Mini-
mimic Mimic 
Mini-
mimic Mimic 
Mini-
mimic Mimic 
Mini-
mimic 
 
Relative changes 
Wages -1.7 -2.4 -0.9 -0.9 -1.2 -1.9 -2.0 -2.1 -2.5 -4.2 
       Private Consumption 2.5 3.3 0.5 2.2 4.2 3.9 1.9 3.2 3.0 6.3 
Labour Demand 2.0 1.0 0.8 1.3 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.3 3.5 2.7 
Labour Supply 0.5 -0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.7 
 Absolute changes (in percentage points) 
Unemployment rate -1.0 -1.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -1.2 -2.0 -1.9 
- of which unskilled -1.6 -3.4 -0.1 -1.0 0.1 -0.5 -1.0 -2.7 -3.6 -4.1 
Government 
consumptiona  -0.4 -1.0 0.0 0.4 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.7 0.1 -1.9 
a
 In % of GDP. Government consumption is adjusted to close the government budget. This is a standard 
procedure in MIMIC simulations (see Graafland et al, 2001). 
Source: CPB (1998) and own computations 
 
The effect of the VVD program on the unemployment levels is relatively small, especially 
for the unskilled (-0,5 %-points). As a result of the lower average tax rate for skilled labour 
(-2,7 %-points), skilled unemployment declines. Unskilled unemployment hardly changes, 
                                                     
9
 The procedure that was used to translate the MIMIC input into Mini-MIMIC input is described in the 
Appendix. 
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since the drop of the replacement rate (-2,2 %-points) is balanced by a lower marginal tax 
rate (-1,0 %-points) (which raises unskilled wages, see above) and a rise in the average tax 
and social premium rate due to the abolishment of the payroll tax cut for unskilled labour 
(0,2 %-points). Labour supply is stimulated through the substitution effect (0,9 %). The 
long-term costs of these plans for the government amount to 0.8% of GDP.  
The policy proposals of D66 are a mixture of the PvdA and VVD proposals. Just as 
in the case of the PvdA, the Mini-MIMIC model produces quite different labour supply 
effects than MIMIC. The main reason here is that D66 proposes an Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) that is phased out between 115% and 150% of the Legal Minimum Wage, 
which generates a high marginal tax rate in this income range. In Mini-MIMIC the rise in 
the marginal tax rate decreases labour supply. In MIMIC, however, this negative labour 
supply effect does not arise, as MIMIC accounts for the fact that the EITC proposed by D66 
is only related to the wage per hour and does not change with the number of hours supplied.  
GroenLinks targets mainly unskilled labour, both by an EITC and the introduction of 
a tax credit that encourages labour supply of part-timers. The effects of the GroenLinks 
policy are large, especially in the unskilled sector. The effects are quite similar to those of 
the other parties, except for the fact that the effects of the GroenLinks policy are bigger, due 
to the large changes in the model input.  
On the whole, we can derive two conclusions from the comparison of the MIMIC 
and mini-MIMIC results. On the one hand, the trends predicted by the Mini-MIMIC model 
are similar to those of the MIMIC model. The two main differences lie in the higher level of 
aggregation of the labour market in Mini-MIMIC, and the fact that an EITC cannot be 
implemented in Mini-MIMIC in the same way as in MIMIC. These differences explain why 
Mini-MIMIC does not simulate the labour supply effects of PvdA and D66 accurately. For 
the unemployment rate, however, the trends are similar. This holds both for total 
unemployment and unskilled unemployment. For these important policy variables, the 
relative ranking of the different parties is almost identical for both models (see Table 3). The 
only difference between the two models is the position of D66 and VVD in the total 
unemployment ranking.  
 
Table 3: Rankings compared between MIMIC and Mini-MIMIC 
  PvdA CDA VVD D66 Groen Links 
Total 
unemployment 
MIMIC 2 5 3 4 1 
Mini-MIMIC 2 5 4 3 1 
Unskilled 
unemployment 
MIMIC 2 4 5 3 1 
Mini-MIMIC 2 4 5 3 1 
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On the other hand, the differences between Mini-MIMIC and MIMIC of the simulation 
effects are considerably if considered from a policy point of view. The absolute difference in 
unemployment reduction ranges from 6 thousand persons (for GroenLinks) to 36 thousand 
persons for D66. This illustrates a point discussed by Graafland (2003) that models based on 
the same empirical research can still yield very different results for complex packages of 
policy proposals because of differences in the details of the models.  
 
4 Monte Carlo analysis 
 
The Mini-MIMIC model contains 17 parameters.10 Eight of these parameters result from 
econometric estimation, one is a dummy variable, and the others are directly based on 
preliminary data. The estimated parameters concern the labour supply equation, the wage 
equation, the employment equation, the import equation and the export equation. The 
estimated parameters in the labour supply equation represent the relative preference for 
consumption over leisure (du and ds, for unskilled and skilled workers respectively). In 
Mini-MIMIC these parameter values determine the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure. The estimated parameters in the wage equation represent the 
bargaining power of employers relative to unions (θ), the productivity in the informal sector 
relative to the formal sector (λ) and the relative importance of the formal sector relative to 
the informal sector (βw). These parameters determine the impact of the average and marginal 
income tax and social premium rate, the VAT rate, replacement rate and unemployment rate 
on wages. The remaining three parameters are the elasticity of substitution between high-
skilled and the low-skilled labour (φ), the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods (κ) and the price elasticity of export demand (ξ). For the parameters that are 
econometrically estimated, standard errors are known (see Table 4). These standard errors 
(and correlations between parameters that were estimated simultaneously) determine the 
asymptotically valid normal distribution that is used to analyze the impact of parameter 
uncertainty in the Mini-MIMIC model. A thousand replications of the model were made 
using Eviews software. For each version of the model a different set of parameters was 
drawn at random from the joint parameter distribution. All other variables, parameters and 
exogenous variables were kept constant. By analogy with the calibration procedure of 
MIMIC, the Mini-MIMIC model contains scale factors that are automatically adjusted in 
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 See the Appendix. 
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order to keep the baseline scenario the same for all parameter sets. In calibrating the model, 
this use of scale factors guarantees that for different values of the parameters (elasticities 
mostly) the outcomes match the preliminary data in the base year. For our analysis this has 
the advantage that the baseline scenario is the same in all replications. Similarly, all 
predicted policy effects are relative to the baseline scenario. 
 
Table 4: Parameters and their standard errors 
Equation Wage Demand for low/high 
skilled labour 
Import Export Labour supply 
Parameter θ βw λ φ κ ξ ds du 
Value 20.4 0.94 0.44 1.5 1.5 2.0 17.5*10-6 55.7*10-6 
Standard error 6.5 a 0.02 a 0.23 a 0.04 b 0.36 b 0.12 b 4.4*10-6 c 13.8*10-6 c 
a
 Based on Graafland and Huizinga (1999) and Graafland et al. (2001) 
b
 Based on Draper (2000) 
c
 Based on the range of estimates reported in Table 4.1 in Graafland et al. (2001) 
 
Table 5: Correlation between parameters of wage equation 
 θ βw λ 
θ 1.00 -0.82 -0.81 
βw -0.82 1.00 0.93 
λ -0.81 0.93 1.00 
 
 
The effects of parameter uncertainty on the Mini-MIMIC predictions for all political 
programs are presented in Table 6. The table shows that political programs with little policy 
changes (CDA, VVD) have a relatively low level of uncertainty, whereas programs that 
propose many new policies (PvdA, D66, GroenLinks) have a relatively high level of 
uncertainty. This observation is in line with the expectations. In the extreme case that a 
party would propose no policy changes the policy scenario would be identical to the 
baseline scenario and thus would by definition have no uncertainty about the difference 
between the policy and baseline scenario. On average, the uncertainty is small but not 
negligible. The total unemployment effect for the program of GroenLinks for example, lies 
between -1.6% and -2% (90% confidence interval). On the whole the ranking of the parties 
is stable and the uncertainty margins on the absolute values is surprisingly small. 
The parameters in the wage equation were estimated jointly. These parameter 
estimates are likely to be correlated due to collinearity of the regressors. Table 5 shows that 
the parameters of the wage equation are indeed strongly correlated. Ignoring these 
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correlations in the Monte Carlo analysis would lead to an incorrect assessment of the effect 
of parameter uncertainty.11 
 
Table 6: Election programs with parameter uncertainty 
Average changea PvdA CDA VVD D66 GroenLinks 
Unemployment rateb -1.4 -0.6 -0.7 -1.2 -1.9 
-  Skilled -0.7 -0.4 -0.8 -0.6 -1.0 
-  Unskilled -3.5 -1.2 -0.7 -2.8 -4.1 
Employmentc 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.4 2.7 
Private consumptionc 3.5 2.6 4.0 3.4 6.2 
Lower/Upper bound (5%) L U L U L U L U L U 
Unemployment rate -1.7 -1.1 -0.7 -0.4 -0.8 -0.6 -1.4 -1.0 -2.0 -1.6 
-  Skilled -0.9 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -1.1 -0.9 
-  Unskilled -4.0 -3.1 -1.4 -0.9 -0.9 -0.5 -3.2 -2.4 -4.4 -3.7 
Employment 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.2 1.6 2.5 2.9 
Private consumption 3.1 4.0 1.8 3.4 3.5 4.6 2.9 3.9 5.7 6.7 
a Average change compared to baseline path. 
b Absolute change compared to baseline path. 
c Percentage change compared to baseline path. 
 
Figure 2 shows the probability densities of the total unemployment rate, skilled 
unemployment rate, unskilled unemployment rate, employment and private consumption. 
For total unemployment, the different distributions of PvdA and VVD overlap with other 
distribution functions, but the distribution function of Groen Links, D66 and CDA do not 
intersect, reflecting stochastic dominance. If the distributions of the outcomes of two 
election programs can be ordered by stochastic dominance it is possible – and in 
applications like these very likely – that the uncertainty has an effect on the levels of the 
outcome variable, but not on the rank order of the election programs with respect to that 
outcome. A more or less similar situation holds for the distributions of the unskilled and 
skilled unemployment rate. For private consumption the overlaps are larger – in particular 
between PvdA and D66 – but the distributions of CDA, VVD and Groen Links still have the 
property of stochastic dominance. For employment most distributions can no longer be 
ordered by stochastic dominance. Without knowing the correlation between the outcomes, it 
implies that for some pairs of parameter vectors the relative position of these parties must be 
different.  
                                                     
11
 Ideally, one should also include the correlations between parameter estimates for different equations. 
However, the CPB did not estimate the parameters reported in Table 4 simultaneously. 
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Figure 2: Distributions of predicted effects relative to the baseline scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the probability distributions in Figure 2 uncertainty is introduced for all parameters 
simultaneously. This raises the question for which parameters the predictions are most 
sensitive. For this purpose we now look at the uncertainty caused by five subsets of 
parameters separately: the elasticity of substitution between products of the high-skilled and 
the low-skilled sector (φ), the price elasticity of export demand (ξ), the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods (κ), the parameters in the labour supply 
equation (du and ds) and the parameters in the wage setting equation (θ, βw and λ). Table 7 
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shows the results for the uncertainty of the predicted policy effects for the unemployment 
rate of skilled workers and for total employment. Uncertainty of the predictions is expressed 
as coefficients of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean of the policy effect). 
The results show that for skilled unemployment the uncertainty of the wage setting equation 
drives most of the uncertainty.  The elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skilled 
labour has the second largest impact, followed by the parameters of the labour supply 
equation. The impact of the uncertainty about the other two parameters is negligible. Similar 
findings apply to the uncertainty with regard to total employment. The uncertainty of the 
wage setting equation is still the most important source of the total uncertainty. The 
parameters of the labour supply equation take the second place, whereas the elasticity of 
substitution between high- and low skilled labour takes the third place. Again, the other two 
variables have a negligible impact on the total uncertainty. 
 
Table 7: Uncertainty of predicted policy effects for subsets of parameters (coefficients 
of variation, in %-points) 
 
Substitution 
high- and low-
skilled 
products 
φ 
Export 
elasticity 
 
ξ 
Substitution 
domestic and 
foreign 
products 
κ 
Labour 
supply 
 
du , ds 
Wage setting 
equation 
 
θ , βw , λ 
High-skilled unemployment      
PvdA 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.7 21.8 
CDA 6.7 1.1 0.2 1.5 10.6 
VVD 2.5 0.2 0.0 1.0 8.0 
D66 1.6 0.3 0.1 0.3 13.3 
GroenLinks 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 9.0 
Total employment      
PvdA 6.5 0.7 0.1 7.2 13.9 
CDA 6.3 0.8 0.1 7.2 3.5 
VVD 2.1 0.2 0.0 8.8 3.2 
D66 4.3 0.4 0.1 2.6 7.0 
GroenLinks 2.1 0.0 0.0 3.7 3.6 
 
 
Table 8: Rankings and their probability of occurrence 
 
Initial ranking 
 
Probability of 
other ranking 
 
PvdA 
 
CDA 
 
VVD 
 
D66 
 
Groen- 
Links  
Unemployment rate 2 5 4 3 1 0 % 
- high skilled 3 5 2 4 1 46 % 
- unskilled 2 4 5 3 1 1 % 
Employment 5 4 2 3 1 68 % 
Private consumption 3 5 2 4 1 7 % 
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Table 8 shows that the rankings of the different political programs with respect to the 
reduction of total unemployment and unskilled unemployment and the increase in private 
consumption are rather insensitive to changes in the parameter set. The main reason is that 
the effects of different parameter sets on the outcomes of the different policy proposals are 
highly correlated. As a result, the absolute values for all parties move in the same direction 
when the parameters set changes. The ranking for skilled unemployment and total 
employment are, however, very sensitive for changes in the parameters, because the average 
change in skilled unemployment rates and total employment for different parties were 
already close to each other in the base simulations reported in Table 2.  
Table 9 reports the probabilities of the alternative rankings for these two targets. For 
the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers the uncertainty mainly affects the second, 
third and fourth position in the ranking. In the median ranking (no parameter uncertainty) 
PvdA comes third, but in 23 percent of the simulations it takes a second position and in 
another 23 percent it is in fourth or fifth place. For total employment the median ranking 
applies only to one third of the simulated rankings. In almost twice as many simulations the 
third and fourth position are interchanged. 
 
Table 9: Alternative rankings for the high-skilled unemployment rate and total 
employmenta 
High-Skilled Unemployment Rate    
 1 2 3 4 5 % 
 GroenLinks VVD D66 CDA PvdA 4,0 
 
GroenLinks VVD D66 PvdA CDA 18,9 
 GroenLinks VVD PvdA D66 CDA 54,3 
 GroenLinks PvdA VVD D66 CDA 19,6 
 
GroenLinks PvdA D66 VVD CDA 3,2 
Total Employment    
 1 2 3 4 5 % 
 GroenLinks VVD CDA D66 PvdA 61,4 
 GroenLinks VVD D66 CDA PvdA 32,5 
 GroenLinks VVD D66 PvdA CDA 2,5 
 GroenLinks D66 VVD PvdA CDA 3,0 
 GroenLinks PvdA D66 VVD CDA 0,6 
a The initial ranking is presented in bold 
 
 
5 Summary 
 
The CPB started analyzing the election programs of the Dutch political parties in 1986. As 
the number of parties grew and more and more aspects of their election programs were 
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analyzed, so did the impact of the results of the analysis. Since the impact of the CPB 
analysis is large nowadays, it is very important to keep track of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the CPB analysis. 
The literature shows that the CPB analysis has some major advantages, but some 
disadvantages as well. The main advantage is that political parties cannot make any false 
promises to the public. All parties have to explain what they want and how to raise the funds 
for their plans. Since all parties are compared to the same baseline scenario and the same 
procedure is used for all parties, comparability of results between parties is possible. The 
main disadvantage is the fact that there is no insight in the uncertainty that surrounds the 
CPB predictions, due to the fact that the CPB does not perform multiple scenario studies to 
visualize uncertainty.  
This paper investigates one source of uncertainty in the CPB analysis, namely the 
uncertainty associated with the estimation of model parameters. This parameter uncertainty 
is studied by performing a Monte Carlo analysis of the electoral programs with the help of a 
small version of the MIMIC model of the CPB named Mini-MIMIC. For most parties the 
results of Mini-MIMIC are roughly similar to the ones of the MIMIC model.  
The Monte Carlo analysis shows that, on average, the uncertainty in the predicted 
changes in important policy variables like unemployment, employment and private 
consumption is small. Furthermore, as changes in parameter sets have more or less similar 
consequences for different parties, the relative ranking of the party programs is rather 
insensitive to parameter changes. This especially holds for unemployment and private 
consumption, because the effectiveness of different programs predicted by the base version 
of the model is highly diverse. For employment, the ranking is, however, more sensitive to 
parameter changes. In 68 % the ranking of political parties differs from the ranking 
predicted by the base version of the model. The main explanation is the fact that the initial 
estimation of both parties was very similar. From this finding we conclude that making 
statements about small differences between parties, as is often done by politicians and the 
media in times of elections, can be inaccurate and should be avoided. More caution and 
warnings by the CPB might be beneficial in these cases. The attitude of the CPB seems 
promising (Velthuis 2004), however the attitude of the media and the politicians is 
worrisome (Haan 2004). Furthermore, we find that the parameter uncertainty in the wage 
equation is the primary factor explaining the distribution in simulation results for most 
policy targets.  
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Overall, our analysis indicates that the CPB analysis of the election programmes is 
rather robust. However, it should be noted that this paper only researches one source of 
uncertainty, namely the uncertainty in estimated parameters of a given economic model. The 
comparison between MIMIC and mini-MIMIC shows, for example, much larger 
divergences, because of differences in the more specific details of the models. Graafland 
(2003) shows that differences become even more pronounced if two or more economic 
independent institutes analyse the electoral programs with models that are developed by 
independent teams of economists. The overall uncertainty in policy analysis of election 
programmes is therefore larger than indicated by our Monte-Carlo analysis with the mini-
MIMIC model.  
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Appendix The Mini-MIMIC model 
 
The core of the Mini-MIMIC model consists of the following equations (see Bovenberg, Graafland 
and De Mooij (2000) for a detailed description and comparison to the MIMIC model). The variables 
of the model are defined in table A.1. Subscripts s and u denote the skilled and unskilled sector 
respectively. 
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Endogenous variables 
Price of skilled goods Ps = 1 Price of unskilled goods Pu = 1 
Price of consumption Pc = 1 Price of production Py = 1 
Wage skilled sector Ws = 265 Wage unskilled sector Wu = 180 
Wage costs skilled sector Pls = 297 Wage costs unskilled sector  Plu = 193 
Real production Y = 2500 Private consumption Cp = 1523 
Government consumption G = 977 Total domestic consumption CGy = 1250 
Total import CGm = 1250 Total export Xy = 1250 
Skilled production Ys = 2000 Unskilled production Yu = 500 
Skilled labor demand Ls = 4.9 Unskilled labor demand Lu = 1.9 
Skilled labor supply Ss = 5.2 Unskilled labor supply Su = 2.1 
Skilled unemployment Us = 0.058 Unskilled unemployment Uu = 0.095 
Average wage W = 241.25 Skilled tax rate TAs = 0.56 
Unskilled tax rate TAu = 0.54 Average tax rate TA = 0.55 
Benefits B = 74.3 Skilled gross replacement rate Rs = 0.65 
Unskilled gross replacement rate Ru = 0.90 Skilled Profits Πs = 544.7 
Unskilled Profits Πu = 133.33 Total Profits Π = 678 
 
Exogenous variables 
Marginal tax rate skilled TMs = 0.6 Marginal tax rate unskilled TMu = 0.6 
Skilled tax deduction Fs = 57 Unskilled tax deduction Fu = 23 
Net replacement rate R = 0.7 Gross replacement rate Q = 0.32 
Number skilled households Ns = 5.2 Unskilled households Nu = 2.1 
Skilled labor productivity hs = 371.25 Unskilled labor productivity hu = 241.25 
Foreign price Pm = 1 Interest rate r = 0.1 
Indirect tax rate TI = 0 Indexation regime βu = 1 
 
Parameters 
βw = 0.94 θ = 20.4 λ = 0.44 φ = 1.5 κ = 1.5 ξ = 2 
ds = 17.5*10-6 du = 55.7*10-6 ν = 0.15 ω = 0.05 ηs = 5.0 ηu = 5.0 
b = 0.8 c = 0.5 σ = 4 µX = 1250   
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Table A1 Symbols, base-year data and parameter values 
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In order to reproduce the MIMIC analysis of the electoral programs, three sets of equations were 
slightly adapted. Firstly, equations (22) make a different replacement rate between skill levels 
possible. This is necessary since some policy proposals explicitly target the replacement rate of a 
certain skill level. Secondly, in equations (19) a separate marginal tax rate is introduced for each of 
the two sectors. This was necessary since some parties targeted their tax proposals on a certain part 
of the labour force. Thirdly, equations (5) and (12) implement changes in the VAT-tariff (BTW). 
The average tax rate published by the CPB excludes changes in the VAT-tariffs. However, since 
most parties propose changes in the VAT-tariffs, implementation of a VAT-tariff in Mini-MIMIC 
was necessary. 
 
For the translation of MIMIC input into Mini-MIMIC input a number of steps were followed: 
1. Adjust the replacement rates for both high and unskilled types in accordance with CPB 
(1998). 
2. Adjust the VAT-tariff in accordance with policy proposals as described by the CPB.12 
3. Adjust the marginal income tax rates. The change in the total marginal tariff is reported by 
the CPB. The effect per skill type is derived from the detailed policy proposals as published 
by the CPB.13 
4. Adjust the average tax rates. The average tax rate for each political party is given by the 
CPB in their publication. The tax deductions have been adjusted proportionally for both skill 
types. Two exceptions have been made for D66 and GroenLinks. Since those parties 
introduced an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the tax deduction for the unskilled sector 
was raised more than proportionally. 
 
                                                     
12
 The Mini-MIMIC model only holds one VAT-tariff whereas the MIMIC model holds two. Therefore, policy 
proposals that change only one VAT-tariff have been modelled in Mini-MIMIC by adjusting the indirect tax level 
0.25%-point less than the actual proposed change in the VAT-tariff. 
13
 CPB (1998) 
